The Algebraic Eraser Diffie-Hellman (AEDH) protocol was introduced in 2005 and published in 2006 by I. Anshel, M. Anshel, D. Goldfeld, and S. Lemieux as a protocol suitable for use on platforms with constrained computational resources, such as FPGAs, ASICs, and wireless sensors. It is a group-theoretic cryptographic protocol that allows two users to construct a shared secret via a Diffie-Hellman-type scheme over an insecure channel.
Introduction
The Algebraic Eraser Diffie-Hellman protocol (AEDH, originally AEKAP) was introduced in 2005 and published in 2006 by Anshel, Anshel, Goldfeld, and Lemieux [1] as a protocol suitable for use on computationally constrained resource platforms, e.g., FPGAs, ASICs, and wireless sensors. More specifically, AEDH is a Group-Theoretic public-key system designed as a computationally efficient solution for low-power or passive embedded systems and devices associated with, among other things, the Internet of Things (IoT).
In November, 2015, Ben-Zvi, Blackburn, and Tsaban (BBT), leveraging the refuted 2012 permutation-based attack of Kalka, Teichner, and Tsaban (KTT) [3] , 1 published a paper [2] claiming a successful attack against AEDH. In the abstract of [2] it is pointed out that certain implementations of AEDH are proposed as an underlying technology for ISO/IEC 29167-20.
The BBT paper presented a heuristic attack that attempts to recover the AEDH shared secret in a single transaction using conjectures assumed to hold when parameters are selected based upon a standard distribution, e.g. a special key choice. These conjectures are only asserted by BBT, they give no indication of how they could be proved. This paper demonstrates that the BBT attack is flawed (with respect to the SecureRF ISO draft) and, at a minimum, over-reaches as to its applicability. The BBT approach fails to run in real time, fails to take into account that special distributions can be selected to defeat one of its conjectures, and assumes a certain collection of data is available to the attacker, which is not always true.
Specifically, the BBT attack is usually thousands of times slower (on a 4 GHz processor) than the running time of the AEDH protocol in a constrained device with limited computing power and memory. The second profile in the ISO 29167-20 draft is an authentication protocol whereby two users in a lightweight cryptographic setting run the AEDH key agreement protocol and obtain a shared secret which is publicly revealed to complete the authentication. If the BBT attack recovers the shared secret after it is revealed and authentication is completed, it is of no consequence. Thus, the attack fails because the information is no longer relevant.
The BBT attack assumes parameters are chosen according to standard distributions. Practically, the use of a standard distribution in a commercial implementation is an over-simplification; realistic deployment scenarios involve special distributions so that at least one of the BBT conjectures does not hold. As a result, the attack becomes ineffective for braid groups with sufficiently many strands.
The BBT attack assumes that all data required for the attack is available to an attacker. As already published in the referenced ISO specification (29167-20), there exist deployment scenarios in which this assumption is false. Therefore, there are clearly scenarios that are not subject to the BBT attack. This paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we review the AEDH protocol. Next, in Section 3 we summarize the BBT attack, and in Section 4 provide two simple bases for defeating the BBT attack, a conjecture counterexample and deployment counterexample. We conclude in Section 5 by noting that the BBT attack is simply a targeted attack that does not attempt to break the method, system parameters, or recover any private keys. 
and for all i, j with |i − j| ≥ 2, we have
Thus any β ∈ B N can be expressed as a product of the form
where i j ∈ {1, . . . , N − 1}, and ǫ j ∈ {±1}.
2 Each braid β ∈ B N determines a permutation in S N , the group of permutations of N letters, as follows. Let σ i ∈ S N be the ith simple transposition, which maps i → i + 1, i + 1 → i, and leaves {1, . . . , i − 1, i + 2, . . . , N} fixed. Then if β ∈ B N is expressed as in (3), we map β to the permutation
Fix a prime power q, let F q be the finite field of order q, and let t 1 , . . . , t N be indeterminates. Consider the group of invertible N × N matrices with entries in the field of rational functions F q (t 1 , . . . , t N ), denoted M. Observe the permutation group S N acts on M by permuting the variables, and we can hence form the semidirect product M ⋊ S N . For i = 1, . . . , N − 1, let CB(b i ) be the matrix defined by
. . .
where the indicated variables appear in row i, and if i = 1 the leftmost t 1 is omitted. We similarly define CB(b
i ) by modifying (4) slightly:
With these matrices in place, each braid generator b i (respectively, inverse generator b
, and we consider the subgroup of M ⋊ S N generated by these colored Burau pairs. Since the pairs (CB(b i ), σ i ) satisfy the braid relations (1)-(2), the natural mapping 
The operation e-multiplication is the right action of the group of colored Burau pairs on the direct product GL N (F q ) × S N and is defined by
With these definitions in place, users Alice and Bob execute the AEDH protocol as follows:
System Data:
• A public matrix m 0 ∈ GL N (F q ).
• A set of public t-values
• Two sets of user conjugates in B N , one of which is public:
It is assumed that the elements a i , b j commute, and that the conjugates are suitably rewritten so that the element z ∈ B N remains unknown to the users.
Private/Public Keys:
• Each user chooses a random private matrix m A , m B of the form
• Each user chooses a random private braid word w A , w B in their respective set of conjugates:
• The user private keys are given by (m A , w A ), (m B , w B ). It is assumed that the user whose conjugates are public will use ephemeral private keys.
• Each user produces and exchanges their respective public keys:
• Both users evaluate the shared secret K using the received public keys and their private keys:
3. The Ben-Zvi-Blackburn-Tsaban Attack
The BBT attack proceeds as follows. The attacker Eve requires access to the public keys Pub A , Pub B of Alice and Bob and any other information transmitted over the insecure channel. This includes the t-values τ 1 , . . . , τ N , the matrix m 0 , and Alice's conjugates {za i z −1 | i = 1, . . . , k}. Let A be the subgroup of B N generated by Alice's conjugates. Let C be the subspace F q [m 0 ] ⊂ M N (F q ) of all polynomials in m 0 over F q , where M N (F q ) denotes the vector space of N × N matrices over F q .
Let P ⊂ A be the subgroup of pure braids in Alice's subgroup. In particular, P is the kernel of the natural projection B N → S N is restricted to A. The group P determines a subspace V ⊂ M N (F q ): we take the subspace spanned by the images Π(w) as w ranges over P .
Let Pub A = (p, g) be Alice's public key, and let Pub B = (q, h) be Bob's public key. To recover the shared secret K, Eve plans to find
• a matrixc ∈ C,
• an element α ′ ∈ V , and
satisfying the following property:
In other words, Eve seeks a factorization of Alice's public key. Using this data, she then takes pure braids α i ∈ P such that the elements Π(α i ) give a basis of V , and writes α ′ as a linear combination
She then forms the matrix
where the superscript denotes the action of h in the semidirect product. Then BBT prove that the shared secret K can be expressed as
As an example, BBT applied their attack to sample data on the braid group B 16 and with the finite field F 256 . The authors successfully recovered the shared secret after a running time of approximately 8 hours and using less than 64 MB of memory.
Eve finds the elementsc, α ′ , andã needed above to reconstruct K in the following way:
• Precomputation stage. Eve first determines a basis of V . Let µ i = (zα i z −1 , g i ) be the elements of M ⋊ S N corresponding to Alice's conjugates, which are known. Eve requires a method to produce elements g in S N that have order r ≤ N and that are short products of the g i . BBT assumes this is always possible. Write g = g(j) ε j , where each g(j) ∈ {g 1 , . . . , g k } and each ε j ∈ {±1}, and let µ(j) be the µ i corresponding to g(j). Then since g r is trivial, the product α = ( µ(j) ε j ) r is pure. Eve constructs many matrices of the form Π(α) and stops when she has a set α 1 , . . . , α m such that the dimension of the span of the Π(α i ) has stabilized.
• Stage 1: Findingã. Let (p, g) be Alice's public key. Eve again must find a product of the µ i of the form (ã, g), that is a product with second component equal to g. This is done using the algorithms in [3] .
• Stage 2: Findingc. Define a matrix γ by (γ, 1) = (p, g) ⋆ (ã, g) −1 . The matrixc is then taken to be an invertible element of the intersection C ∩ γV .
• Stage 3: Remaining parameters. The matrix α ′ is defined to bec −1 γ.
4.
Defeating the Ben-Zvi-Blackburn-Tsaban Attack 4.1. Conjecture Counterexample.
As detailed above, in the BBT attack it is assumed that there are many short expressions in the publicly known Reader conjugates which are associated with low order permutations. While this statement holds most of the time, it is not correct in every instance. At the end of their paper, BBT indicate that it may be possible to immunize the Algebraic Eraser against their attack by working with very carefully chosen presentations. The following demonstrates how to effectively produce a set of permutations whose short expressions have high order most of the time, countering their conjecture. The values of the parameter N will necessarily be in a higher range than is discussed in BBT, but the method can be computationally viable by applying suitable projection operators associated to singular first private matrices.
To counter the conjecture produce a set of k ≥ 2 permutations ρ 1 , ρ 2 , . . . , ρ k in the symmetric group S N with the property that almost all short expressions (short words in ρ 1 , ρ 2 , . . . , ρ k ) have order greater than
for some constant α N > 0. The constant α N is yet to be determined, but initial testing shows it is not too small.
Let p N denote the largest prime such that the sum of the primes less than p N does not exceed N. By the prime number theorem, we have p N ∼ √ N log N.
We then define
. .
Here, for every prime p and any 1 ≤ i ≤ k, we let c i (p) denote a p-cycle in S N . The p-cycles c i (p) can be randomly chosen and are assumed to satisfy the following additional properties:
• For each 1 ≤ i ≤ k, the cycles c i (3), c i (5), . . . , c i (p N ) are disjoint.
• For each prime 3 ≤ p ≤ p n , the cycles c 1 (p), c 2 (p), . . . , c k (p) all have the same fixed points.
• For each prime 3 ≤ p ≤ p n , no two of the cycles c 1 (p), c 2 (p), . . . , c k (p) are integer powers of each other.
Since the cycles are disjoint, the order of each ρ i (1 ≤ i ≤ k) is given by the product of primes
where the above asymptotic formula again follows from the Prime Number Theorem.
To facilitate working with large braid groups one can choose a highly singular seed matrix m 0 in AEDH which has the property that for any g ∈ GL N (F q ), the matrix product m 0 · g projects onto a submatrix of g consisting of r rows of g for some small 1 < r < N. This reduces all the public keys to matrices of size r × N instead of N 2 . In addition, it is possible to work with a much smaller finite field when N is large, and, hence, arrive at manageable public key sizes. It remains to determine optimal parameters for specific applications. This will be the topic of a future paper. The BBT attack requires knowledge of both public keys, the t-values, the seed matrix m 0 , and one set of conjugates. Lack of any single one of these items will defeat the attack.
The BBT paper references the ISO 29167-20 draft specification of the Algebraic Eraser. That specification contains two deployment profiles for AEDH. In one of the profiles one party has access to a database that contains public key material for the other parties. Specifically, in this profile an attacker never has access to one of the public keys and, as a result, cannot mount the attack to derive the shared secret. Other deployment scenarios also exist where an attacker does not have access to one or more pieces of data required to mount the attack. In all these scenarios the attack cannot succeed.
Conclusions
The BBT attack is simply a targeted attack that does not attempt to break the method, system parameters, or recover any private keys. Its limited focus attempts to recover the shared secret in a single transaction for a class of weak keys. The attack is based on several conjectures, none of which are proven. As per one BBT conjecture, when conjugate material is chosen poorly the attacker can find short expressions and mount an attack. However, when the conjugates are chosen with specific classes of permutations the conjecture fails as does the BBT attack for braid groups with sufficiently many strands. Finding counterexamples of other BBT conjectures is left for a future paper.
Similarly, deployment scenarios (such as one of the profiles in ISO 29167-20) deprive an attacker from the information required to mount the attack. Without all required data the attack cannot even begin.
Therefore, AEDH, a group-theoretic cryptographic protocol that constructs a shared secret via a Diffie-Hellman-type scheme, is secure for many practical applications, including platforms with constrained computation resources, such as FPGAs, ASICs, and wireless sensors.
